what it is against, the transatlantic alliance seems equally unclear about what it is for.
Alongside this topographical shake-up can be found important intellectual challenges: how to conceptualise the primary fact of the post-Cold War order -US power; how to employ suitable normative frames for capturing issues of sovereignty, intervention and responsibility in the contemporary world; and how to comprehend a complex security climate signified by novel notions of war, shifting meanings of combatant/non-combatant, and the changing character of terrorism both by and against states. In short, it is nigh-on impossible to imagine a world without 1989 -there are few issues which appear untouched by it.
This book does not seek to overturn these two core assumptions -they stand as the principal indicators of the influence of 1989 and its associated processes. But the book does seek to question three issues which lie behind, or perhaps lurk beneath, their easy acceptance.
First, although the events of 1989 are, to be sure, acts worthy of celebration, they have also engendered some unintended, yet important, consequences, perhaps most notable amongst them exposure of the chronic weaknesses contained in a hyperventilated form of liberal capitalism. One of the core wagers of this volume is that the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War have produced mixed, paradoxical, even contradictory outcomes.
Although the political, economic and cultural orders generated after the fall of communism have, for the most part, been an improvement on what was in place before, this has not always been clear cut. Substantively -as the contributions to this volume make clear -1989 has bequeathed an ambivalent legacy.
Second, although 1989 can serve as a useful barometer between old and new, we should be careful about the general utility of this shorthand -there have been considerable continuities between the pre-and post-1989 eras. Four chapters in this book make this point forcefully. John Hobson argues that policies of post-Cold War intervention should be seen as the latest exemplars of an older suite of ideas rooted in nineteenth century Western international thought. Aviezer Tucker highlights the impact of totalitarian legacies on Russian and Chinese development since 1989, looking at how the restoration of autocratic rule in these countries has produced a ruling class of post-totalitarian nomenklatura which seeks to strip the country's assets rather than engage in contractual politics. Rick Saull's discussion of the Middle East argues that, by removing the one-dimensional straightjacket associated with Eurocentric thinking and by replacing it with a view that embraces the chronic unevenness, multiplicity and complexity of world politics, we begin to see the importance of local patterns of development on global politics. In her contribution, Saskia Sassen points to the ways in which post-Cold War capitalist expansion constitutes a return to long-established exploitative practices, albeit on novel scales. In this way, a complex picture emerges in terms of the temporality of 1989, one which embraces important continuities alongside and, to some extent instead of, simple notions of 'all change'. 'black swans': events which stand as 'outliers' from prevailing frames of reference; generate a set of impacts beyond their immediate field; and which are subsequently rationalised via pre-existing tools of explanation. Certainly, all three of Taleb's categories are fulfilled by 1989: the changes which took place in 1989, particularly during the second half of the year, were as surprising to most observers as they were to many participants; their impact has been extensive, if uneven; and over the past twenty years, there have been no shortage of attempts to explain, and sometimes to explain away, their occurrence (e.g. Dahrendorf 1990; Garton Ash 1990; Habermas 1990; Tismaneanu (ed.) 1999; Bunce 1999; Sakwa 1999; Kumar 2001; Outhwaite and Ray 2005) . One of the aims of Taleb's book is to illustrate how black swans, for all the surprise they invoke, occur more frequently than we imagine. And certainly, surprise is a constant feature of world history -take as an illustration Lenin's (1968: 842) comment in January 1917 that 'we, the old, may not live to see the decisive battles of the coming revolution'. Before the year was up, of course, the Bolshevik Revolution had begun the process not just of reshaping Russian politics and society, but also broader strands of international relations. Along with the Bolshevik Revolution, the events of 9/11 and the German invasion of Russia in World War II, 1989 stands as an archetype of the continuing capacity of human history, even events and processes of considerable magnitude, to surprise.
Less surprising has been the cottage industry which has sprung up around 1989 over the past twenty years. Some Kremlinologists found that Soviet Studies could quite easily be translated into post-Soviet Studies. Many transitologists who had previously worked on the break-up of authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe and Latin America transplanted their models fairly straightforwardly to the blank canvass provided by events in Eastern and Central Europe. Political theorists and sociologists surveyed the possibilities and challenges of a global era (e.g. Held et al 1999), IR scholars pondered the stability -or not -of a unipolar world (e.g. Wohlforth 1999; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008) , while many economists saw 1989 as marking the final victory of Hayek over Keynes, often becoming directly involved in far-reaching privatisation and liberalisation programmes (e.g. Sachs 1994 ).
Regardless of diverse orientation and intention, most of these accounts concentrated on three core issues: first, establishing the (usually endogenous) causes of the collapse of communism; second, assessment of the broader meanings of 1989, mostly in terms of its revolutionary quotient; and third, investigation of the consequences of 1989, particularly in Europe. This book goes beyond these studies by concentrating on the most important, yet often the most neglected, of these foci -the consequences of 1989 -and by exerting much of its efforts on examination of the world beyond Europe. As such, the book does not provide a history, revisionist or otherwise, of the events of 1989, nor does it seek to establish (again) why 1989 happened when and how it did. Rather, the volume is geared at unravelling the complexities of time, space and substance associated with the global 1989.
As John Hobson points out in his chapter for this volume, for both scholars and policy makers, 1989 serves as an influential 'temporal othering' device, a shorthand used across the political spectrum. For liberals, 1989 marked the shift from 'bad Cold War' to 'good postCold War', liberating the world from an era of conservative order and intervention to a novel epoch in which international institutions, multilaterial forms of governance, human rights and humanitarian intervention could bury 'backward' ideas such as sovereignty, power politics and realpolitik. For foreign policy realists, 1989 marked the reverse journey, from 'good Cold War' to 'bad post-Cold War' as bipolar stability was replaced by the instability of a unipolar and/or multipolar world, a crisis in global governance, and heightened levels of insecurity stemming from a range of security threats: a rising China, a restored Russia, a plethora of rogue and failed states, and the emergence of transnational terrorist networks such as alQaeda. John Mearsheimer (1990) was not the only high-profile realist to argue that we would soon miss the sureties of the Cold War. And nor was Francis Fukuyama (1989) For all their differences, both of these positions agreed that something substantial had taken place in 1989. The great debate about how to categorise the events of 1989 -as revolutions (rectifying (Habermas 1990) or otherwise), refolutions (Garton Ash 1990) or as part of a wave of liberal democratic transitions (Rustow 1990; Huntington 1991; Ackerman 1992 ) -tended to concentrate on three issues: the failure of revolutionaries to conjure novel utopian visions; the considerable continuities between old and new regimes; and their relative lack of violence. To start with the first of these, what many observers failed to note was the liberal utopia that underpinned 1989. Ideas of freedom, justice and equality may not have been new, but they were certainly utopian. As such, participants took these ideals seriously, whether this meant invoking shock therapy programmes in the interests of promoting radical economic freedom or establishing regimes which legitimised freedom of expression, even for former communists, neo-Nazis and other unsavoury types. Not all anti-communist activists proved to be cuddly -xenophobic nationalists and market fundamentalists were just as implicated in the fall of communism as liberal intellectuals. Not only this, the experience of 1989's 'heartland states' over the past twenty years has served to illustrate the contradictions of revolutionary (in this case, liberal) utopianism in a way which will be familiar to students of past revolutions: the restrictions of political freedoms in order to provide security and order; the continued importance of state activism in the economic sphere in order to redistribute public goods, manage inequality and reduce other distortions of the market; and the requirement of a strong public sector which can curtail the abuses of uncivil society when it tends towards extremism and violence. Indeed, one of the ironies of 1989 has been exposure of the limits of unfettered political, economic and cultural liberalism. By ushering in an era of liberalism without critique, 1989 actually served to renew critiques of liberal utopianism, critiques which continue to gain strength both in the West and the wider world. issues: internationalism and imperialism, sovereignty and solidarity, universal aspirations and particular struggles. In more general terms, the left has turned away from issues of representation and redistribution in favour of those of recognition (Fraser 2008) . This hollowing out of political and economic opposition in the West appears, at least in part, to have been met by renewed interest in issues abroad, whether this be campaigns for debt relief, the war on poverty, or the fostering of support for global civil society. These social movements are, of course, important. But as a substitute for a radically left-wing alternative to current conditions, they provide thin gruel indeed.
In this sense, as Fred Halliday argues in his contribution, if 1989 was a failure for socialism, particularly in Europe, it can also be seen as defeat for liberal capitalism. The dark side of capitalist accumulation, captured powerfully in Saskia Sassen's chapter, has been sharp increases in inequality and criminality -much of the world is poor and insecure. Most troublingly, it is clear that the 2008 financial crisis was not something external to the system, but a process which arose from a conjuncture of inefficiencies and perversities endemic to the system itself, most notably the shift towards a form of 'casino capitalism' (Strange 1986 ).
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The latest failure of capitalism was also a failure of the economics discipline -the 'efficient market hypothesis', ideas of 'self-correction' and support for no-holds barred deregulation became commonplace ideas within an economics profession that 'mistook beauty for truth' by employing a range of techniques which, although looking good on paper, turned out to bare little resemblance to how economies actually functioned (Krugman 2009 ). As Saskia Sassen notes, the 2008 crisis had its roots in fundamental shifts in ideas about, and practices of, the international political economy during the two decades preceding 1989. Indeed, the central ideas and ordering mechanisms of the contemporary international political economy (self-regulation, marketisation, neo-liberalism, privatisation etc.) were already ascendantand had taken institutional form -well before 1989, hence the immediacy of shock therapy policies in (and on) 1989 heartland states. In general, the idealization of the market -by academics and policy makers alike -acted as a blinker on real world events; markets turned out not to be perfect and rationality turned out not be utilitarian, at least not much of the time.
And the consequences of this utopian occlusion -on peoples, societies and markets around the world -proved to be painful in the extreme.
Given this, it could be argued that 1989 should be understood as a conjunctural rather than an epochal shift (Rosenberg 2005) . In other words, 1989 did not mark the emergence and institutionalisation of a novel set of political, economic and social relations. Rather, it emerged primarily out of collapse and implosion -the disappearance, virtually without a shot, of the Soviet Union and, with it, the final strand of the Cold War order, much of which had already melted away. The shifts and reconfigurations of social, economic and political power relations associated with 1989, dramatic and extensive though they have been, are for the most part contained within existing forms of social, political and economic order rather than marking a fundamental epochal transformation in the nature of these configurations.
Those states and other actors at the centre of 1989 sought not to generate novel institutional alliances or to remake international relations in their own image but to actively give away elections in Poland (on the same day, so it happened, as the massacre in Tiananmen Square) which acted as an important stimulus for opposition movements throughout the region. This much we know. But part of any assessment of the impact of 1989 must consider which events it is to be judged against. For example, if we mark our temporal cards from 1945-1989, then the events appear to herald the end -or at least the winding down -of the Cold War, whether we consider this as a single frame with multiple dimensions (Westad 2005) or as divisible into two discrete stages (Halliday 1983) . If, following Eric Hobsbawm (1994), we prefer to see the twentieth century as somehow 'short' -sandwiched between the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the events of 1989, we get a second, more birds-eye, view on proceedings. And it is possible to go back still further: to 1848 and the Springtime of Nations (Völkerfrühling Wiosna Ludów), which, like 1989, also witnessed first-hand the mobilising force of nationalism, the apparently spontaneous eruption of protests in major European cities, the enduring power of ideas of freedom, equality and justice, and the (mostly peaceful) loss of nerve by the old guard; to 1789 as François Furet (1999) (1948, 1967, 1973, 1987) provided by the Arab-Israeli conflict; the fluctuating role of petro-dollars in regional politics; and the mobilising power of strands of political Islam. In short, if 1989 stands as a point of historical reckoning, much is staked in terms of when observers choose to start counting as well as when they decide to stop doing so.
Many of the contributors to this book engage with the notion of 1989 as constituting some kind of 'rectifying', 'recuperating' or 'catching up' model of revolutionary change, an idea first associated with the German critical theorist Jürgen Habermas (1990) in the immediate aftermath of the revolutions. To some extent, Habermas has a point -1989 did mark the end of a detour, albeit an exceptionally powerful one. State socialism matched liberal capitalism in offering a distinct take on what was considered to be the most authentic articulation of modernity: both were revolutionary creeds which sought to govern on this basis. In this sense, both liberal capitalism and state socialism can be seen as quintessentially modern. As such, it was no surprise to see ideas associated with the holy trinity of modern social theorists (Weber, Marx and Durkheim) appear both to explain 1989 and its consequences: from Weber, we saw the limits of the iron cage of bureaucratic rationality as captured not just by socialist state managers but also by their counterparts in the West and in international organisations; from Marx, we were reminded of the necessary inequities and exploitation inherent in the accumulative practices of industrial capitalism; and from Durkheim we could bare witness to the anomie of modern life -the lack of solidarist scripts that arise from the break-up of old forms of order (what the novelist Monica Ali calls 'the limits of autonomy'), intensely present in both the contemporary West and post-1989 states.
All in all, the events of 1989 reinvigorated many old debates about what it meant to be both human (Latour 1993 ) and modern (Gray 2007) . In short, 1989 reawakened commentators to many of the contradictory aspects of modernity of which great modern theorists were well aware and which social science is charged to study.
To some extent, therefore, dreams of a radical alternative to capitalism did fade after 1989. But, for two reasons, such dreams were never realistic. First, one of the great mistakes of Marx's theory (and, by association, those of neo-Marxists such as Immanuel Wallerstein) was its underestimation of capitalism's capacity for 'creative destruction' (Schumpeter 1942) this sense, what did for state socialism was the shift in Western economies to consumer based, service led economies, the emergence of computer based technologies and the rise of financial innovations following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s.
Second, as Chris Armbruster notes in his chapter, state socialism contained chronic internal weaknesses. Stalinist purges, a militarised economy and the normalisation of revolutionary ideology into a self-perpetuating bureaucratic creed replete with its own ruling class -the nomenklatura -undermined the Soviet system from within. By 1968 or thereabouts, there were precious few communists -or at least Marxist-Leninists -left in the Eastern Bloc. A Czech professor returning to Prague in 1970 after two years in the Netherlands complained that 'there were far too many communists over there. At least in Prague, I won't have to meet any.' 3 In this sense, what Isaac Deutscher (1960) described as 'the great contest' was anything but that, however it appeared to participants at the time. It was a contest which contained a pre-determined victor, something captured evocatively by the post-War US ambassador to Moscow, George Kennan (1947) , in the long-telegram sent to his political masters at the onset of the Cold War. Gorbachev, 'new thinking' and other such événements were certainly significant in terms of the timing of Soviet collapse, but longer-term trends better explain how and why the system failed. We did not know precisely when communism would implode, but that it would at some point in time was not in question.
In this sense, therefore, 1989 was an end -an end that Francis Fukuyama (1989) Such lessons -one of the ten chronicled by Barbara Falk in her chapter -stem from a delusion which appears to be shared by nigh-on the entire US political elite. As Falk notes, the fusion of overwhelming American power allied to powerful ideologies such as neoconservatism has engendered a sense in which US power is not just good for the United
States, but also a tool which can -and should -be used to reshape the world in its own image. Of course, this powerful cocktail of power and utopian ideals has not gone unchallenged. First, there is the challenge to US military hegemony noted by Devore and others. Second, there is the political challenge to American primary represented by alternatives models of governance: China, Russia and, to some extent, the European Union.
Third, although much of the world is led by -or wants to be led by -American cultural trends, there is a certain unorthodox blend to this picture: Bollywood films, Chinese restaurants and other such global cultural formations are generating an increasingly complex, sometime hybridised, array of cultural forces. And economically, sovereign wealth funds, protectionist policies and forms of economic nationalism indicate a process of renationalisation, even as this sits alongside moves towards global, regional, transnational and local scapes (Mann 1997; Weiss 1998) . In short, the most recent phase of capitalist accumulation is serving to fracture global space.
The 'Where' of 1989?
As Saskia Sassen notes in her chapter for this volume, the fracturing of spatial relations is not a new phenomenon, albeit one which is only now taking global shape. Indeed, as John
Hobson and Rick Saull point out, the Cold War may only have appeared to delineate a certain singularity to world events because of a Eurocentric gaze on the conflict. After all, although the bipolar order was stable and relatively peaceful in Europe, this was not the case for many states and regions around the world where the post-1945 period was decidedly hot.
In short, Europe was the central front of strategic and diplomatic calculations, but it was the Third World that generated the majority of the crises and nearly all of the casualties of the Reagan' should, in this sense, be seen as a manifestation of a longer-term commitment by the United States to counter the Soviet challenge wherever it appeared.
To some extent, therefore, the Cold War can be understood as an inter-imperialist rivalry (the Soviet 'empire of justice' vs. the US 'empire of liberty'), as a contest between two revolutionary regimes, or, as noted above, as a confrontation between rival visions of modernity. But however it is described, as Fred Halliday points out, it was a conflict which, despite the chronic deficiencies which would eventually lead to its downfall, most participants thought the Soviets could win. Indeed, even in the early part of the 1980s, the correlation of forces looked somewhat favourable for the Soviets: Tanzania, Algeria and Nicaragua were showcases for leftist progressivism; there was a general, much lauded, drive towards 'Afrocommunism ' and, in 1982, To some extent, the desire of states to maintain control over their foreign and economic policies -despite claims to the contrary -stand as important markers of the post-1989 world. There has been a certain renationalisation of security functions (for example via new anti-terrorist legislation), economic policy (most credit crunch policy has either been state based or inter-state based) and identity politics (captured, for example, by the rise of anti-immigrant parties and movements). As with our understanding of time, therefore, 1989 appears to have brought us a complex spatial panorama in which we are both closer in terms of an acceleration of intersocietal integration, particularly in terms of economies, peoples and ideas, but also further apart in that this homogenisation has a doppelgänger in the form of a return to the local, whether visited in claims of local autonomy, ethnic identity, or antiimmigration. Again, therefore, there is a fundamental contradiction in play: combined interactivity alongside uneven differentiation; universality and fragmentation; singularity and fracture.
Given this picture, it is difficult to establish any type of concrete hold on the multiple vectors which constitute contemporary global space. As Bob Jessop (2002 Jessop ( , 2007 (Buzan 2006 ). There will, no doubt, be a certain rescaling of global political order in order to accommodate the many challenges to Western international order. And perhaps, over the longue durée, the last 300-400 years of Western domination will come to be seen as an exception as power returns once more to Asia. In the meantime, we will continue to cast around for apt frames for the contemporary conjuncture, whether this is understood as imperial (e.g. Ferguson 2008; Hardt and Negri 2000) , a case of 'one superpower, many great powers' (Kagan 2008) , or as Richard Haass (2008) prefers, 'nonpolar'.
Conclusions and openings
Yogi Berra, the famous American baseball player and pundit once said that, 'it is tough to make predictions, especially about the future'. 1989 is no exception to his maxim. Some twenty years after the fall, it is difficult to recall the sense of surprise and excitement which emerged from the removal of the Soviet empire first in Eastern and Central Europe, and some two years later, from its own backyard. As the international media moved from city to city, and increasing numbers of Europeans came onto the streets in order to chase away the old order and to welcome in the new, there was a sense of the world shifting beneath people's feet. In some ways, the events of 1989 stand as epigraphs for a 'runaway world' (Giddens 2002 ) which precludes easy analysis. Perhaps world politics over the last twenty years has occupied some kind of 'liminal space' (Kumar 2001) , serving as an 'interregnum' (Cox, Booth and Dunne (eds.), 1999) or as 'abnormal times' (Fraser 2008) . More likely, though, the
Cold War only appears simple in retrospect. For those who lived through the period, the Cold War seemed anything but straightforward and the outcome of the conflict anything but certain, even during its final endgame. As such, this book does not seek to provide a 'postfactum' flattening of the Cold War into a monochrome story with a pre-determined outcome.
Rather, the contributors seek to question how effectively the end of the Cold War works as a tool of 'temporal othering' between old and new, and indeed, between good and bad. lesson for academic enquiry as well as for policy makers, reminding us of the need to ask good questions rather than look for easy answers, to use imagination rather than fulfil the requirements of 'normal science', and to work on developing sound judgements rather than following the latest fad. Our task in this book is to both problematise the place of 1989, but also to make sense of the major trends which have arisen from it over the past twenty years.
To that end, one of the central arguments in this book is that 1989 represents, at least for the most part, a triumph of chronos (sequential time) over kairos (qualitative temporal change) (Hutchings 2008 Given this, much as it is important to recognise the importance of 1989, one of the lessons of this book is that years and dates rarely acts as sound guides to complex processes.
In fact, rather like seeking to capture democracy only via elections, dates may serve to obscure more important, longer-term trends. In short, dates offer us punctuation marks to world history, but they should not be seen as the masters of world historical development.
Our goal in this book is to draw together trends that, quite often, are seen only in parallel or as zero-sum: homogenisation and heterogeneity; modernity and jihad; Stalinist terror and Gorbachevian 'new thinking'. Each chapter in the book disrupts a prevailing wisdom and exposes 'uncomfortable truths' -in this sense, they represent high-water marks of academic enquiry and critical engagement. Of course, no book can -or should -close down a particular subject, and this is no exception. There are a range of topics not dealt with here:
detailed survey of the normative landscape of the post-Cold War world, attention to the remasculination of public space which has accompanied a relative decline in the position of women globally, and the emergence of the 'dark side of globalisation' as represented by people trafficking, transnational criminal networks, the illicit drugs trade and so on (Halliday 2008) . And there are many regions which have, at least in terms of extended discussion, slipped beneath our radar. What we offer, therefore, is not a definitive guide, but a series of openings about one of the iconic historical landmarks of our time. 'Out of the crooked timber of humanity', Kant wrote, 'no straight thing was ever made'. Our intention in this book is not to carve a straight line out of humanity's crooked timber. But we do aim to make sense of the complexities, contradictions and paradoxes of the post-1989 world. Ten years ago, a major study claimed that, following 1989, 'everything we know is up for grabs and what comes next is anyone's guess (Verdery 1999: 83) . This book seeks to provide the clarity afforded by an extra decade of hindsight.
